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Bounding the seed length of Miller and Shi’s unbounded
randomness expansion protocol
Renan Gross and Scott Aaronson
Abstract
Recent randomness expansion protocols have been proposed which are able to generate an
unbounded amount of randomness from a finite amount of truly random initial seed. One such
protocol, given by Miller and Shi, uses a pair of non-signaling untrusted quantum mechanical
devices. These play XOR games with inputs given by the user in order to generate an output.
Here we present an analysis of the required seed size, giving explicit upper bounds for the
number of initial random bits needed to jump-start the protocol. The bits output from such a
protocol are ε-close to uniform even against quantum adversaries. Our analysis yields that for
a statistical distance of ε = 10−1 and ε = 10−6 from uniformity, the number of required bits is
smaller than 225,000 and 715,000, respectively; in general it grows as O(log 1
ε
).
1 Introduction
Building a device that generates a random string using quantum mechanics is easy: All it needs to
do is to prepare a qubit in a state in the X basis, and then measure it in the Z basis. However,
what if you didn’t build the device yourself, but instead it was given to you by your arch-nemesis?
How could you certify that the output is indeed random, and not, for example, deterministically
fixed, or somehow correlated to the arch-nemesis? To treat these problems, protocols have been
developed recently which allow one to certify that the output of an untrusted device was indeed
random (R. Colbeck, [2]). The devices in these protocols don’t just prepare and measure qubits
in different states, but are made of components that play XOR games with each other. As these
games require random bits as input, effort was invested in generating more randomness than was
invested as input; this is called randomness expansion. Both polynomial (S. Pironi et. al [9]) and
exponential (Vaziarni and Vidick [11]) expansion has been described, and recently even infinite
expansion (Chung, Shi, Wu and Miller [1, 8], Coudron and Yuen [4]). The latter protocols take as
input a finite truly random string and output a nearly uniform string of arbitrary length; further,
the distance from uniformity depends only on the number of random bits used as seed. All of
[1, 4, 8] rely on a “spot checking” technique by Vazirani and Vidick [11] and Coudron, Vidick and
Yuen [3] when generating inputs to the XOR games; their contribution and differences are in how
they compose the inputs and outputs between devices and the analysis of that composition. The
proofs given in those papers are asymptotic and do not give concrete bounds on the number of
initial random bits needed in order to provide this infinite expansion with the desired soundness
and security. In this paper, we give a rough estimate of the number of bits needed in order to obtain
a desired distance from uniformity. We follow the analysis of Miller and Shi [8], who, in conjunction
with Chung, Shi, and Wu [1], built a protocol which uses only two devices. This protocol appears
to be simpler to analyze than the one suggested by Coudron and Yuen [4] and is likely to have
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Figure 1: The seed length obtained by using the technique described in Section 4. The linear
dependence was obtained by passing a fit through the needed seed length for different ε’s in the
range 10−1 to 10−11.
smaller constant overhead: it uses less quantum devices and does not use the relatively complicated
Reichardt-Unger-Vazirani protocol [10].
The analysis yielded an upper bound for a single iteration of the protocol - which gives expo-
nential expansion - and a technique for numerically approximating the number of bits needed for
unbounded iterations. For example, for an error of 10−6, the seed length is bounded from above by
715,000; generally, from numerical calculations, the relation between the seed length approximation
and the error can be bounded from above by a linear relation: SeedLen ∝ 31328 · log2 1ε , as can be
seen in Figure 1.
Randomness is needed for two purposes: generating XOR games, and extracting randomness
from high entropy strings. As we will see later, generating the XOR games is the more demanding
of the two, taking the larger portion of the overall random bits needed: the ratio between them is
about 2:1.
2 Spot Checking protocol
2.1 The gist of the protocol
The protocol requires two identical non-interacting devices. A device consists of n non-interacting
components; these components are going to play a XOR game. The number n depends on the game
being played; thus the CHSH game requires two components, while the GHZ requires components.
A single run consists of having a single device play a very large number of games. If the device
wins enough games, the protocol succeeds and an output is generated according to its answers; by
an appropriate variant of the Bell inequality (depending on the game), this output is guaranteed to
have some min-entropy. If the device doesn’t win enough games, the protocol aborts.
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The main point is that the input to the games is not uniformly random; in fact, most of the
time, the input is just zeros. Only on a small, randomly selected number of games are the inputs
chosen at random. As the device doesn’t know where the randomized inputs are going to be, this
forces it “play honest” and play a non-deterministic winning strategy on almost all of the games, if
it wants to pass the protocol. Thus, a string with high min-entropy can be obtained, while using
very little random bits - most of the inputs were predetermined zeros.
The output string can then be fed into a randomness extractor, yielding a nearly-uniform random
string. The above procedure is then repeated again and again, each time using the extracted string
as a source of randomness for choosing where the non-zero games are, and each time alternating
between the two devices (the alternation is an important part of proving the quantum security, but
is not needed in our analysis, and we will not go in detail about it here).
2.2 More formally
The protocol is composed of iterations. During an iterations a single device is used, and all of its
components play the XOR game. The following arguments are fixed:
N : The output length. This is a positive integer which denotes how many times we will play the
game.
η : The error tolerance. This is a real number∈ (0, 12) which denotes how large a statistical error
we allow our components to make relative to the optimal winning strategy’s expectation.
q: The test probability. This is a real number∈ (0, 1) which denotes the probability that a round
will be a randomized “game round” (see ahead).
The single iteration protocol, denoted R, is then as follows:
1. Repeat steps 2-4 N times:
2. A bit g ∈ {0, 1} is chosen according to the distribution (1− q, q)
3. If g = 1 (“game round”), then an input string is chosen at random from {0, 1}n, according to
the specific game chosen. For example, for the GHZ game, the possible strings are 000, 100,
010, 001. If the devices win, record 0. Else, record 1, and mark “Failure”.
4. If g = 0 (“generation round”), then the input string composed entirely of zeros 00...0 is given
to the components. Record the bit generated by the first component.
5. If the total number of failures exceeds (1−wG + η)qN , where wG is the winning probability
for the optimal strategy, the protocol aborts. Otherwise it succeeds, and outputs the N -bit
sequence of outcomes it recorded.
It can be shown that with the right choice of parameters η, q, and N , the output string can be
ε-close to (1− δ)N min-entropy for any choice of δ, with ε exponentially small as a function of N .
The amount of randomness needed to generate this string goes roughly as logN , so it is possible to
generate a string with arbitrarily more min-entropy than what we started with.
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A quantum-secure extractor is then applied to the output, yielding a smaller but nearly uniform
random string. It is possible to construct extractors that extract a constant fraction of min-entropy,
while using an additional seed of size O(log2 Nε ), where ε is the distance to uniformity
1.
Thus, running one iteration and applying an extractor yields exponentially many more bits
than we started with. By alternating between devices and using the output of one device as the
randomness seed for the game generation and extractor of the other, an unbounded amount of
random bits can be produced.
2.3 Layout
We start by analyzing the seed length needed for a single iteration of the protocol: given a target
error in uniformity, how many random bits do we need in order to get just the exponential expansion
for one device? We then look at how the error grows when we play several iterations of the protocol.
The XOR game used by the devices has been chosen to be the GHZ game, for several reasons: it
features a large gap between the best quantum strategy (100% win rate) and the best classical
strategy (75% win rate); its best strategy always wins; and Miller and Shi give a bound to its “trust
coefficient”, a constant that appears in their analysis.
3 Single iteration with extraction
A single iteration requires randomness in two places: choosing the inputs, gi to the XOR game for
the device, and seeding the extractor. These two are not quite independent of each other: if we
play N games with the device, our output will be a string of length N with min-entropy linear in
N . Both the game input randomness, and the extractor seed length are polylogarithmic in N . We
will start by analyzing the XOR game, and then proceed to the extractor seed.
3.1 Definitions
We follow the same notation as Miller and Shi. Logarithms written as log x are in base 2; logarithms
written as lnx are natural.
For a given XOR game G, let fG be smallest failing probability for a game; that is, the probability
that the best quantum strategy will fail to win the given game. For the GHZ game, we have fG = 0.
The trust coefficient for a game is a number vG ∈ (0, 1] (described in more detail in the main text,
but no more than this is needed). For the GHZ game, it was proven that vG ≥ 0.14; we will denote
this bound as cv = 0.14.
The following functions appear in the theorems and corollaries:
Π(x, y) , 1−
(
1 + 2x
x
)
log
[
(1− y) 11+2x + y 11+2x
]
pi(x) , 1 + 2x log x+ 2(1− x) log x = 1− 2h(x)
It can be shown that limx→0Π(x, y) = pi(y). The derivative of the pi function is
1A quantum secure extractor is needed only if we are afraid that an adversary might be entangled with the internal
mechanism of the device, and thus gain information about our random string. If this is not the case - if we only wish
to verify that the device generates random bits without conditioning on a possible adversary’s information - then a
constant fraction extractor can be built with a seed size of only O(log N
ε
) [6].
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pi′(y) = 2(log(1− y)− log y)
For y ≤ 0.5 we have:
• pi(y) is non-increasing and has a minimum of −1 at y = 0.5.
• pi′(y) is negative and non-decreasing, with a zero at y = 0.5. It tends to −∞ for y → 0.
Hεmin(S) denotes the ε-smooth min-entropy of a quantum state S. The state Γ
s
EGIO denotes the
state of success of a iteration for a given adversary E, game G, input I and output O.
3.2 Choosing randomness for the XOR game
The corollary numbering in this section is according Miller and Shi’s paper [8]. An important result
in that paper is Corollary I.5, which states:
Corollary (I.5). Let δ > 0 be a real number. Then, there exists positive reals K, b, q0 and η such
that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q, where q ≤ q0, then
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGIO|EGI) ≥ N · (1− δ)
where ε = K · 2−bqN .
This is done by proving lower bounds on the rate of entropy. To quote Miller and Shi: “Our
approach, broadly stated, is as follows: we show the existence of a function T (v, h, η, q, k) which
provides a lower bound of the linear rate of entropy of the protocol. [...] In principle, our proofs
could be used to compute an explicit formula for the function T , but we have not attempted to do
this because the formula might be very complicated.”
In light of these words, they have only shown the behavior of T in the limit of small q and k
parameters. In the following section, we will:
• Attempt to find explicit bounds for T for “small enough” parameters.
• Calculate how many random bits are needed, given fixed q and N , in order to obtain desired
min-entropy rate and smoothness values.
3.2.1 Bounding the T function
In the original paper, the T function is given by composition of a sequence of other functions. It
can be expanded to yield:
T (v, h, η, q, k) , − 1
r0qk
· max
t∈[0,1]
[log
(
(1− q) 2−rqk·Π(r0qk,t) +
+ q
{
1− (1− 2−k)
[(
h
2
)1+r0qk
+ v1+r0qkt
]})
−
h
2 + η
r0
where
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r0 , min
{ −v
pi′(ηv )
,
1
qk
}
.
Effectively, because q and k can be made arbitrarily small, r0 =
−v
pi′(ηv )
. We also define:
E(v, h, η, q, k) ,
2
r0
Which, under our assumption, simplifies to:
E(v, h, η, q, k) =
−2pi′(ηv )
v
Miller and Shi use these functions to talk about the min-entropy found in the output of a large
number of games:
Theorem (I.1). Suppose Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q. Then for any k ∈
(0,∞)and ε ∈ (0,√2], the following holds:
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGO|EG) ≥ N · T (vG, 2fG, η, q, k) −
(
log(
√
2/ε)
qk
)
E(vG, 2fG, η, q, k).
Also,
lim
(q,k)→(0,0)
T (v, h, η, q, k) = pi(
η
v
)
lim
(q,k)→(0,0)
E(v, h, η, q, k) =
−2pi′(ηv )
v
.
We will now look at the appropriate theorems from their papers and root out the needed con-
stants from their proofs.
Corollary (I.2). for every η > 0 and δ > 0, there exist b > 0, q0 > 0 such that the following holds:
if one iteration of the protocol is played with parameters N, η, q ≤ q0, then
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGO|EG) ≥ N ·
(
pi(
η
vg
)− δ
)
and ε =
√
2 · 2−bqN .
The proof follows by finding q0, k0 > 0 small enough, and M large enough so that for all
q < q0, k < k0:
T (vG, 2fG = 0, η, q, k) ≥ pi( η
vg
)− δ
2
E(vG, 2fG = 0, η, q, k) ≤M.
Setting b =
k0 · δ
2M
then yields the correct result. We will now find such q0, k0.
We’ll start with E. By definition:
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E =
2
r0
=
2
min
{
−vG
pi′( η
vG
)
,
1
qk
} = 2max
{
qk,
−pi′( η
vG
)
vG
}
So for small enough q0 and k0, specifically:
q0 · k0 ≤
−pi′( η
vG
)
vG
,
we have that
E =
−2pi′( η
vG
)
vG
We don’t know vG, but q0 and k0 will obey this inequality if:
q0 · k0 ≤ −pi′( η
cv
) ≤ −pi
′( ηcv )
vG
≤
−pi′( η
vG
)
vG
.
In this case, we have:
E =
−2pi′( η
vG
)
vG
≤ −2pi
′(η)
cv
, M
And we have found our M .
Satisfying the condition for T requires a bit more calculations. First we replace vG by either
1 or cv as appropriate, as in the above inequalities. We wish to make the left hand side of the
inequality T (vG, 2fG = 0, η, q, k) ≥ pi( η
vg
)− δ2 smaller, so if we manage to solve that inequality, we
will certainly solve the original one.
We therefore look for a q0, k0 pair such that for all q < q0, k < k0,
−1
r1qk
· max
t∈[0,1]
[
log
(
(1− q) 2−r1qk·Π(r1qk,t) + q
{
1−
(
1− 2−k
)
c1+r1qkv t
})]
− η
r1
≥ pi( η
vG
)− δ
2
where r1 = −cvpi′(η) ≤ r0 = −vGpi′( η
vG
)
.
Note that pi(x) is a decreasing function in the interval [0, 12 ], so pi(
η
vG
) ≤ pi(η) as vG ≤ 1. Out
inequality will be satisfied if we can satisfy:
−1
r1qk
· max
t∈[0,1]
[
log
(
(1− q) 2−r1qk·Π(r1qk,t) + q
{
1−
(
1− 2−k
)
c1+r1qkv t
})]
≥ pi(η)− δ
2
+
η
r1
This is not easy to do analytically, but numerical calculations can be performed. They show
that for each value of δ and η, there is only a small region around (0, 0) in which q and k can take
values. An example for δ = 0.025, η = 4.2 · 10−5 can be seen in Figure 2.
It is possible to take any combination of k0 and q0 within the specified range. We numerically
optimize over such values to find the pair that yields the smallest seed size.
For a given k0 and using the M previously found, we have:
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Figure 2: A 3d plot of the value of a clipped T as a function of q and k: the value is zero if it doesn’t
satisfy the inequality T (vG, 2fG, η, q, k) ≥ pi( η
vg
)− δ2 . As can be seen, only small k and q values are
applicable. Here, δ = 0.025 and η = 4.2 · 10−5
b =
k0 · δ
2M
=
k0 · δ
2
−2pi′(η)
cv
=
k0 · δcv
−4pi′(η)
Next, we will find the constants implied in Corollary I.3, which shows that there is high
min-entropy even conditioned on the input to the device.
Corollary (I.3). For every η > 0 and δ > 0, there exist K,> 0, b > 0, q0 > 0 such that the
following holds: if one iteration of the protocol is played with parameters N, η, q ≤ q0, then
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGIO|EGI) ≥ N ·
(
pi(
η
vg
)− δ
)
As in the proof for the corollary, we choose δ′ = δ/2. The associated q′0 and b
′ give:
ε′ =
√
2 · 2−b′qN =
√
2 · 2
k0·δcv
4pi′( ηcv )
Nq
The extra error is, assuming that q0 ≤ δ2n :
e−N [δ/2n−q0]
2/2
so the total error is now:
ε =
√
2 · 2−b′qN + e−N [δ/2n−q0]2/2
=
√
2 · 2−b′qN + 2− log e2 [δ/2n−q0]2N
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Assuming b′ as before:
=
√
2 · 2
k0·δcv
4pi′(η) qN + 2−
log e
2
[δ/2n−q0]
2N
We want to bound this from above by a single exponent of the form K · 2−bqN . Note that
2−
log e
2
[δ/2n−q0]
2N ≤ 2−
log e
2
[δ/2n−q0]
2N q
q0
as q ≤ q0 and the exponent would be smaller in magnitude. Taking
b = min
{
k0 · δcv
−4pi′(η) ,
log e
2
[δ/2n − q0]2 1
q0
}
,
we then have:
ε =
√
2 · 2−
k0·δcv
−4pi′(η) qN + 2−
log2 e
2
[δ/2n−q0]
2N
≤
√
2 · 2−bqN + 2−bqN
=
(√
2 + 1
)
2−bqN
So K =
√
2 + 1.
Next, we find the constants needed for Corollary I.5. We restate it here:
Corollary (I.5). Let δ > 0 be a real number. Then, there exists positive reals K, b, q0 and η such
that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D, where q ≤ q0, then
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGIO|EGI) ≥ N · (1− δ)
where ε = K · 2−bqN .
In order to do so, we find an η such that for a given δ, we have:∣∣∣∣1− pi( ηvG )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ2
And then when we choose δ′ = δ/2 of the original, we are guaranteed to be within the range
[1− δ, 1], as needed for the corollary. Remembering that pi(x) is a decreasing function of x, we can
set vG = cv, and the inequality will still hold. Lets mark x =
η
cv
and look at the behavior of pi(x).
We want the following inequality to hold:
1− pi(x) ≤ δ/2
Opening up the pi function, this reduces to:
−x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) ≤ δ/4
This can easily be found numerically, yielding a number x0 ∈ (0, 0.5). We then have:
ηmax = x0 · cv
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With this we generate an η ∈ (0, ηmax) parameter and the constants q0, k0, K, and b (with a
δ value one fourth of the one we used for calculating η, as we had to halve it twice in our proofs).
For these parameters, playing one iteration of the expansion protocol will produce a string with
min-entropy:
Hεmin (Γ
s
EGIO|EGI) ≥ N · (1− δ)
where the smoothness is bounded by:
ε = K · 2−bqN
Conversely, for a given ε of required smoothness, we have the following constraint on q and N :
q ·N = − log
ε
K
b
=
log Kε
b
This will be used when deciding on N and q values for a desired error level.
3.2.2 Random bits for protocol R
Having established a relation between q and N , we can proceed to calculate the number of random
bits needed in order to execute protocol R with N games.
Randomness comes into play in two places in protocol R: when deciding on which games we use
random inputs instead of dummy zeros, and choosing the actual inputs when this happens. Since
we are playing the GHZ game, the latter requires 2 bits for each time we play a real game.
By definition of the bits gi, generating them requires no more random bits than their Shannon
entropy. Combining this with the previous statement, we need
2N (−q log q − (1− q) log(1− q))
initial random bits in order to play N games.
3.3 Seed length for the extractor
3.3.1 Quantum secure extractor
Part of the initial randomness needed for one execution of the protocol is the random seed given to
the extractor, which we apply on our N bit output that came from playing N games. Based on the
paper “Trevisan’s extractor in the presence of quantum side information” [5], we will construct, from
bottom up, a suitable extractor. For the purpose of this analysis, we assume that out extractor will
operate on N bits which have at least a constant fraction of ε-smooth min-entropy.
Trevisan’s extractor and its quantum security relies on single bit extractors; the ones in [5] use
list-decodable codes. All theorems and lemmas in this section are numbered according to [5].
Lemma (C.2). For every n ∈ N and δ > 0, there is code Cn,δ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ that is (δ, 1δ2 )-
list-decodable. Further, n¯ = poly
(
n, 1δ
)
.
Guruswami et al. [7] give a construction with n¯ = O
(
n
δ4
)
; after extracting the constants we
have
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n¯ ≤ 32 n
δ4
.
Knowing how to construct list-decodable codes, we can use them as extractors:
Theorem (C.3). Let C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ be an (ε, L) list-decodable code. Then
C ′ : {0, 1}n × [n¯] → {0, 1}
(x, y) 7→ C(x)y
is a
(
logL+ log 12ε , 2ε
)
-strong extractor.
Notice that as an extractor, the seed given to C ′ has n¯ different inputs, and therefore requires
only t = log n¯ bits of randomness.
Combining the two, for any ε > 0 we can build an extractor by putting in δ = ε2 into Lemma
C.2, and using that list-decodable code in Theorem C.3. This will give a (3 log 1ε , ε) extractor
(actually, we have a (log 1
4ε2
+log 14ε , ε)-extractor, but log
1
4ε2
+log 14ε = 2 log
1
2ε
+log 14ε = 3 log
1
ε−6,
so we certainly have a (3 log 1ε , ε)-extractor as well).
Our extractor requires t = log
(
3216nε4
)
= log
(
512 nε4
)
bits of randomness.
Next we will compose 1-bit extractors to create general ones:
Theorem (4.6). Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong 1-bit extractor with uniform
seed, and S1, ..., Sm ⊂ [d] a weak (t, r)-design. Then a Trevisan style extractor composition, ExtC :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m gives a (k+rm+log 1ε , 3m
√
ε)-quantum-proof-strong (n, d,m) extractor.
We are going to use this theorem in order to get a constant rate extractor. Assume that you
want an extractor whose output is ε-close to uniform. Then the 1-bit extractor needs to be ε′ = ε
2
9m2
close to uniform. Set k = m and r = 2 km = 2. Then the resultant extractor produces output that
is ε away from uniform and works with any entropy larger than
k + rm+ log
1
ε′
= k + 2m+ log
9m2
ε2
= k + 2k + 2 log
3m
ε
= 3k + 2 log
3k
ε
= 3k + 2 log
1
ε
+ 2 log 3k
≤ 4k + 2 log 1
ε
Ignoring the log 1ε in the min-entropy (it will be small comparable to k), we get that a source
with 4k min-entropy can give us m = k random bits. Since our N bits have (1− δ)N min-entropy,
we have k = 14(1− δ)N , and also m = 14(1− δ)N . Putting this into t, we get:
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t = log(512
N
ε4
)
= log(512
N
ε8
94m8
)
= log(512 · 94Nm
8
ε8
)
= log(512 · 94N
(
1
4 (1− δ)N
)8
ε8
)
= log(512
(
3
4
(1− δ)
)8
· N
9
ε8
)
= log 512 + 8 log
3
4
(1− δ) + logN + 8 log N
ε
What is d, and how do we get a design? According to Lemma 5.5 in [5], we can build the desired
design with
d = t
⌈
t
ln r
⌉
We chose r = 2 so this can be effectively written as
d ≤ t(t+ 1)
ln 2
3.4 Total randomness for one iteration
Choose a desired distance from uniformity ε > 0, and the two parameters δ ∈ (0, 1) and η ≤ ηmax.
Find the constants q0, k0, b. From the relation q ·N = − log
ε
K
b =
log
√
2+1
ε
b and the fact that q ≤ q0,
we have a lower bound on N ; pick any N greater than that, and calculate the corresponding q. The
total bits of randomness required is then given by the combined result of section 3.2.2 and section
3.3.1:
SeedLen ≤ 2N (−q log q − (1− q) log(1− q)) + t(t+ 1)
ln 2
This will generate 14(1− δ)N bits which are 2ε close to uniform - one ε is due to the min-entropy
smoothness, the other is due to the expander.
This process is only fruitful if the number of generated bits is larger than the number of input
bits. This may not be the case for any choice of ε, q, and N ; however, we can always attain
this property by increasing N : For a fixed ε, the extractor term grows as log2N , while the game
generation term grows as −Nq log q ∝ − log 1N = logN .
Choosing δ and η is not trivial. A small δ value means that the resultant string has higher
min-entropy and thus more bits are extracted; however, it also means tighter constraints for q0 and
k0. The parameter η affects b, q0 and k0 in a non-linear way. Hence, we optimized these parameters
numerically for each choice of fixed ε.
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4 Multiple iterations and results
The errors for multiple iterations are additive: Using randomness that is ε away from uniformity
for an algorithm that expects uniform randomness will add an ε to the output error. In order to
keep the error constrained, we must therefore decrease it exponentially (or more) after each time
the protocol is played.
The simplest we can do is to cut ε’s value in half after each iteration. This will give no more
than 4ε error, and is certainly achievable - the number of output bits grows exponentially, while the
increase in the number of bits caused by halving ε is polynomial. This strategy actually overshoots,
as the exponential expansion means that there will be many bits left over after each iteration which
are not used for the next iteration. Here is an estimation scheme based on the above:
Scheme: The largest seed requirement is imposed by the first iteration. We can minimize the
number of excess bits produced in the first iteration, as follows: find a combination of q and N such
that the generated number of bits is just the amount required for the next iteration (which has ε
half the original, so requires more bits). Of course, this number too requires calculation; a simple
estimation is achieved assuming that the number of bits generated in the second iteration is in the
same proportion to its seed as the number of bits generated in the first iteration is to the initial
seed. This scheme means there is no loss of seed in the first iteration, while there may be loss in
the next ones; however, it is easy to implement.
Using the first method with an initial error of 0.25 · 10−6 (to yield a total distance of no more
than 10−6 away from uniformity) gives an initial seed of less than 715,000 bits. In general, plotting
the required number for several different ε values shows a linear relation between the seed length
and log 1ε . This is shown in blue in Figure 3, with a slope of 31328.
A presumably better technique would be to use all the generated bits as seed in each consecutive
iteration. We set an ε for the first iteration and a target N . Then, for each iteration, we optimize
the expression
SeedLen ≤ 2N (−q log q − (1− q) log(1− q)) + t(t+ 1)
ln 2
so as to get the smallest ε possible.
The analysis of putting a bound on the resultant
∑
εi has not been performed. Further, in order
to achieve global optimization one still has to choose an initial N for the first iteration. However, a
lower bound for this value can be obtained (for this particular approximation method) by looking
at just one iteration: for a given ε, how many initial bits must we use just to get back what we
invested? As any further iterations just increase the error, and as getting a longer output inherently
requires more initial random bits, this gives a bound from below. So running the R protocol once
with ε four times the desired value gives us a lower bound. Multiplying ε’s value by four is equivalent
to decreasing log 1ε by 2. So with the current slope obtained, this can give an improvement of no
more than 64,000 bits.
It is interesting to ask which one of the two imposes stronger requirements: generating XOR
games, or seeding the extractor. For one iteration, the extractor seed requires O(log2(Nε )) random
bits, while the XOR game generation requires O(Nq log q). However, N , q and ε are connected, and
cannot be changed independently. Figure 3 shows the number of bits required as a function of log 1ε
(applying the same method), assuming that the extractor operates for free - it costs us no bits at
all to extract. Of course, there are no deterministic extractors, but this gives a bound on the XOR
games. It appears that the XOR game generation requires about 2/3 of the randomness - the ratio
between the two slopes is with extractor
without
= 3187521380 = 1.49.
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Figure 3: Amount of randomness needed vs. log 1ε . In blue is the regular scheme; in red is the same
scheme but assuming that our extractor is deterministic and requires no random bits.
5 Future work
While we have given a rough upper bound for the amount of randomness needed to “jumpstart”
infinite expansion, questions and research directions still remain.
1. What is the optimal XOR game for such a protocol?
2. Is the Coudron-Yuen analysis more or less efficient than the one by Miller and Shi? Can
this type of protocol be improved upon? What is the theoretical lower bound for any infinite
protocol?
3. How does the number of bits improve if we do not ask for quantum security (security against
entanglement with the inner working of the devices), but just want to certify randomness?
Are there O(log Nε ) constant rate strong extractors which can be shown to be quantum secure?
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